

## ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE DECLINE OF MACEDON

THE figure of Alexander inevitably dominates the history of his reign. Our extant sources are centrally focussed upon the king himself. Accordingly it is his own military actions which receive the fullest documentation. Appointments to satrapies and satrapal armies are carefully noted because he made them, but the achievements of the appointees are passed over in silence. The great victories of Antigonos which secured Asia Minor in 323 BC are only known from two casual references in Curtius Rufus,<sup>1</sup> and in general all the multifarious activities in the empire disappear from recorded history except in so far as they impinge upon court life in the shape of reports to Alexander and administrative decisions made by him. Moreover, the sources we possess originate either from high officers of Alexander's court, such as Ptolemy and Nearchus, or from Greek historians like Callisthenes and Cleitarchus, whose aims were literary or propagandist and whose interests were firmly anchored in court life. Inevitably Alexander bestrides that narrow world like a colossus and monopolises the historical picture. But even the figure of Alexander is far from fully fleshed. No contemporary history survives, and for continuous narratives of the reign we are dependent upon late derivative writers who saw Alexander through the filter of centuries of rhetoric and philosophy. The king had long been a stock example of many contradictory traits; he was at once the conqueror and the civiliser, the tyrant and the enlightened king. Cicero and Seneca saw him as the type of unbridled license, Arrian as the paradigm of moderation.<sup>2</sup> The result is that the sources present a series of irreconcilable caricatures of Alexander but no uniform or coherent picture.

The bias of the sources has continued to the present day. Alexander is still a potent symbol, for good or ill, and modern histories interpret his reign according to their authors' preconceptions of his character, discarding or explaining away any divergent source material. As in antiquity there are stock pictures which recur. Droysen's Alexander, the champion and propagandist of Hellenic culture, has become virtually the symbol of modern Greek nationalism. Tarn's visionary Alexander, with his dream of the brotherhood of man, continues to be resuscitated in various metamorphoses.<sup>3</sup> The multiplicity of pictures is a measure of the fallibility of the method, and the concentration upon the person of Alexander produces a serious distortion. Modern historians have been fascinated by Alexander the man and largely ignore the material costs of his conquests. Tarn, for instance, was properly revolted by the Malli campaign with 'its dreadful record of mere slaughter',<sup>4</sup> but he rationalised the episode as unique and it did not affect his concept of Alexander as a humanitarian. Similarly the savagery of Alexander's reprisals in Sogdiana is explained from Alexander's side as a disciplinary measure.<sup>5</sup> There is no attempt to view the campaign from the Sogdian side. For them it involved premeditated massacre of the male population of insurgent cities, the forced imposition of Greco-Macedonian colonists, the permanent removal, in Alexander's army, of the prime of their young fighting men. After three campaigning seasons the native population was decimated and cowed, and the foundation was laid for nearly three centuries of Greek domination. In Sogdiana the impact of

<sup>1</sup> Curt. iv 1.35, 5.13. On these events and the source tradition see W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* ii (Cambridge 1948) 110 f., 177; Errington, *CQ* xix (1969) 234 f.; P. Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* (Paris 1973) 53-74.

<sup>2</sup> For the importance of Alexander as a literary exemplum see A. Heuss, 'Alexander der Grosse und die politische Ideologie des Altertums,' *Antike und Abendland* iv (1954) 65 ff., and (briefly) A. B. Bosworth, *Historical commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* i (Oxford 1980) 12-14.

<sup>3</sup> Convenient and differently pointed digests of

modern scholarship on Alexander are provided by F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse: das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens* (SAWW cclxxxv (1973) 609-651) and E. Badian, 'Some recent interpretations of Alexander', *Fond. Hardt* xxii (1976) 279-311.

<sup>4</sup> *Alexander the Great* i 103, reproduced verbatim by A. K. Narain, *Greece & Rome* xii (1965) 160.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. (e.g.) Tarn i 68 ('a local revolt which severity might repress'); R. Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great* (London 1973) 302 ('his garrisons had been murdered, so he repaid the compliment').

Alexander caused a profound change in the cultural pattern of the area. It is a change which is documented in the sources but only peripherally.<sup>6</sup> Superficially the story is of epic sieges spearheaded by Alexander and of sporadic guerilla fighting; the darker and more interesting picture of what was happening to the native population must be pieced together from isolated references. The results are achieved by taking the focus of investigation away from Alexander himself. The method can be extended, and in this paper I wish to examine the effect of Alexander's campaigns upon his own people, in particular upon the phalanx infantry, that indispensable nucleus of his army.

The Macedonian army has never lacked discussion. The classic analyses of Droysen and Berve have been supplemented and modified by a string of recent contributions, predominantly in English.<sup>7</sup> As a result we have a reasonably good idea of the structure and organisation of the army, viewed from the standpoint of Alexander. We know how it operated as a tool of conquest, under the direction of the great captain. What is less documented is the effect of the conquests on his men. How many of them were killed and mutilated? How many troops were recruited from Macedon to fuel the conquering armies? What was the demographic effect of the incessant overseas combat? These questions can only be answered in part, given the fragmentary nature of the available evidence, but, even so, the picture they suggest is sombre. It can be shown that the numbers of Macedonian reinforcements summoned to Asia in the course of the reign have been consistently underestimated. A considerable proportion of the child bearing male population was taken away and never returned, with disastrous consequences for the military strength of Macedon. Within a generation her manpower was perceptibly lower, and she never regained the military supremacy enjoyed at the end of Philip's reign. In the heyday of the hellenistic monarchies the homeland of Macedon became increasingly feebler as the human price of Alexander's conquests was paid. This is not a novel view. It was, for instance, succinctly stated by Rostovtzeff.<sup>8</sup> But the implications have never been fully drawn, certainly not in histories of Alexander, nor, in my opinion, has the evidence been adequately stated. Even the most generous calculations have understated the wastage of phalanx infantry during the reign and the number of reinforcements conveyed from Macedon.

In the spring of 334 Alexander crossed the Hellespont with his expeditionary force. According to Diodorus, who gives detailed figures, the Macedonian infantry was 12,000 strong and another 12,000 were left behind to serve as the home army under Antipater.<sup>9</sup> There was an unspecified number of Macedonian infantry operating with the advance force sent to Asia

<sup>6</sup> For a brief outline of Alexander's settlement of Sogdiana and its implications see Bosworth, 'Alexander and the Iranians', *JHS* c (1980) 10-11, 17-18.

<sup>7</sup> J. G. Droysen, 'Alexanders des Grossen Armee', *Hermes* xii (1877) 226-252 = *Kleine Schriften zur alten Geschichte* ii (Leipzig 1894) 208 ff.; H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* i (Munich 1926) 103-217. Recent research in English has started from Tarn's modifications of Berve's treatment of the subject (*Alexander the Great* ii 135-169). See in particular P. A. Brunt, 'Alexander's Macedonian cavalry', *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 27-46; (additions and modifications in his Loeb edition of Arrian, vol. ii [1983] 483-90); R. D. Milns, 'The army of Alexander the Great', *Fond. Hardt* xxii (1976) 87-136.

<sup>8</sup> M. I. Rostovtzeff, *A social and economic history of the Hellenistic world* ii (Oxford 1941) 1136: 'Thousands of adult male Macedonians left their native country never to return. A larger part of the Macedonian army was never demobilised after Alexander's death; on the contrary it was from time to time reinforced by fresh Macedonian recruits.' Cf. also M. Launey, *Recherches sur*

*les armées hellénistiques* i (Paris 1949) 290.

<sup>9</sup> Diod. xvii 17.3, 5. These are the only detailed figures for the individual contingents of the Macedonian army, but the infantry numbers at least are self-consistent, totalling 32,000 (which Diodorus scales down to a round figure of 30,000). The contemporary historians, Anaximenes and Callisthenes, gave substantially higher totals, 43,000 and 40,000 respectively (Plut. *de Alex. fort.* i. 3, 327 E, *Alex.* 15.1; Plb. xii 19.1), which are usually thought to include the expeditionary force operating in Asia Minor under Parmenion (cf. Droysen [n. 7] 229; Brunt [n. 7] 34; Milns, *JHS* lxxxvi [1966] 167). In that case the advance force was probably 10,000 strong. Polyaeus v 44.4 is not such direct confirmation as is sometimes assumed. He states that Parmenion and Attalus had 10,000 troops at Magnesia, but the figure is suspiciously rounded, perhaps exaggerated to give Memnon additional credit for his victory. In any case the entire army was not present at Magnesia. The third commander, Calas, was apparently elsewhere, and he presumably had forces of his own.

Minor in 336 which was at least 10,000 strong.<sup>10</sup> The phalanx troops would not, I think, have been proportionally more numerous than in Alexander's own army at the Hellespont; in that case we have a maximum of 3,000. The total of Macedonian infantry with Alexander in 334 was therefore around 15,000. Figures can be extrapolated for the army strength at the end of the campaign ten years later. After the mutiny at Opis in 324 Alexander discharged a body of Macedonian veterans, which all sources state to have been 10,000 strong.<sup>11</sup> The remnant of the army has been variously estimated. Recently Milns has suggested that Alexander retained a total of 3,000 phalangites, while Schachermeyr would argue for up to 6,000.<sup>12</sup> Both seem to me to fall far short of the truth. Admittedly, no source gives a total for the phalanx infantry at the time of Alexander's death, but there are several clear indications. Immediately after his death the senior commander Peithon was sent to deal with a rebellion of Greek colonists in Bactria, and we are explicitly told that he chose by lot (ἐκλήρωσεν) 3,000 Macedonian infantry.<sup>13</sup> That presupposes a much larger pool of phalangites to be drawn upon. What is more, during his absence,<sup>14</sup> the regent Perdicas launched his invasion of Asia Minor with a strong nucleus of Macedonians. When he left the area in the spring of 321 he was able to leave an army of Macedonians operating in Armenia under Neoptolemus,<sup>15</sup> and his brother Alcetas, who was left to pacify Pisidia, also had Macedonian troops.<sup>16</sup> No numbers are given, but these forces were clearly large. To match Neoptolemus' phalanx of Macedonians Eumenes had to raise a counter-force of 6,300 cavalry (Plut. *Eum.* 4.4). Later in 321, when Neoptolemus' men had been incorporated in his own army, its strong Macedonian complexion made it a very attractive acquisition for Alcetas.<sup>17</sup> These Macedonian forces commanded by Neoptolemus and Eumenes must have numbered thousands rather than hundreds, and Alcetas' army will have balanced them. Perdicas then left very substantial Macedonian contingents in Asia Minor when he invaded Egypt, and his own grand army cannot have been drained of national infantry. Peithon had rejoined him with his Macedonian forces (Diod. xviii 36.5), and there was also the formidable body of Silver Shields (*argyraspides*), 3,000 strong. These men had served as Alexander's foot guard and were retained by the regent as his headquarters corps.<sup>18</sup> They certainly acted as a unit in the invasion of Egypt. The documentation is tantalisingly incomplete, but it seems clear that the Macedonian infantry with Alexander at the time of his death in Babylon amounted to 8,000 and probably more. There is a rough check in Arrian's description of the curious mixed phalanx established just before Alexander's death; Macedonian infantry were combined with 20,000 native Persian recruits, so that in each file there were 4 Macedonians

<sup>10</sup> In 335 Calas was operating in the Troad with a mixed force of Macedonians and mercenaries (Diod. xvii 7.10). The Macedonian component was evidently significant, for when Memnon raided Cyzicus he disguised his men with the typically Macedonian *kausia* (Polyaen. v 44.5).

<sup>11</sup> Arr. vii 12.1; Diod. xvii 109.1, xviii 4.1, 12.1, 16.4; Justin xii 12.7 (11,000—probably including cavalry).

<sup>12</sup> Milns (n. 7) 112; Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* (SAWW cclxviii (1970), 14 f., *Alexander der Grosse* (n. 3) 491.

<sup>13</sup> Diod. xviii 7.3 (he was to receive 10,000 mercenary infantry from the upper satrapies).

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus gives no impression how long Peithon's expedition lasted, but he had to concentrate an army from a number of different satrapies and then face the returning colonists somewhere to the east of the Iranian plateau. The operations presumably lasted well into 322.

<sup>15</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 4.3–4, cf. 5.5; Diod. xviii 29.5; *PSI* xii 1284 (on which see Bosworth, *GRBS* xix [1978] 227–237).

<sup>16</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 5.2 (Alcetas refused to help Eumenes in 321 on the grounds that the Macedonians under him would not fight against Craterus); cf. Diod. xviii 44.3–5.

<sup>17</sup> This is revealed by a new fragment of Arrian's *History of the Successors* Book X, preserved on two palimpsest folios in the University of Gothenburg: J. Noret, 'Un fragment du dixième livre de la *Succession d'Alexandre* par Arrien', *AC* lii (1983) 235–42 (F 73', lines 9–11: ταῦτα δὲ ἐπρασεν Ἀλκέτας ἐν πρώτοις καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦτῳ [sc. Εὐμένει] δύναμιν Μακεδονικὴν τὴν πλείστην οὖσαν ἐθέλων ἑαυτῷ προσποιῆσαι). Eumenes had annexed Neoptolemus' forces on the eve of the encounter with Craterus (Plut. *Eum.* 5.5; Arr. *Succ.* F 1. 27; cf. *GRBS* xix [1978] 235–36) and kept them subsequently, diminished by the battle losses. Despite his victory he acquired none of Craterus' Macedonian veterans, who made their escape as a body and joined Antipater's army (Diod. xviii 32.3–4; Arr. *Succ.* F 1.27 *fin.*; Nepos *Eum.* 4.3).

<sup>18</sup> Arr. *Succ.* F 1.35 (Roos). For the strength of the *argyraspides* at this time see Diod. xviii 58.1, xix 28.1, 30.6.

to 12 Persians.<sup>19</sup> In other words the Macedonians assigned to this bizarre amalgam numbered 6,700—and there were presumably other, wholly Macedonian, units. The Silver Shields at least should have maintained their corporate identity. Again a minimum of 8,000 Macedonian infantry is indicated at the time of Alexander's death.

The phalanx troops at Babylon were essentially the troops retained after Opis. Professor Brunt has understandably argued that they had been supplemented by large scale reinforcements which arrived from Macedon in the last period of reign.<sup>20</sup> The sources say nothing of such movements, but, as we shall see, their silence is hardly conclusive. The situation in Macedon is a more decisive consideration. In 324 Antipater had been given specific instructions to bring a new army from Macedon to compensate for the veterans discharged with Craterus. There had obviously not been substantial reinforcements beforehand, and Antipater certainly did not leave Macedon before Alexander's death.<sup>21</sup> He may have sent contingents in advance, but none are recorded and Alexander's explicit instructions were that he should bring out the reinforcements in person. In any case the political situation was tense, with Antipater wavering on the brink of revolt, and he is hardly likely to have sent away prime phalanx men if there was any possibility of their being used against him subsequently. I conclude that the Macedonian infantry with Alexander before the Opis mutiny totalled at least 18,000<sup>22</sup> and was significantly stronger than the original phalanx which had crossed the Hellespont in 334.

That is the reverse of what one would expect. The last ten years had seen continuous campaigning, not only major battles and sieges but also incessant guerilla warfare with constant skirmishing in the countryside. There had also occasionally been detachments of phalanx troops to serve as garrisons (notably in Egypt), and from 330 disabled Macedonians had regularly been settled in the dozens of military settlements established in the east of the empire.<sup>23</sup> The vagaries of nature also played a part. There are repeated reports of natural disasters, such as the crossing of the desert to the Oxus, the winter storm in Sogdiana, and, above all, the calamitous passage across the Gedrosian desert; and there are suggestions in the sources that the losses they incurred surpassed any battle casualties.<sup>24</sup> Finally there must have been constant attrition through fatigue, sickness and accident. Even in the incomplete record provided by Arrian there is an impressive list of senior officers who died from disease,<sup>25</sup> and the casualty rate will have been higher among

<sup>19</sup> Arr. vii 23.3–4. Milns (n. 7) 127 f., believing in a maximum of 3,000 Macedonian infantry, argues that only c. 12,000 of the Persians were used in the mixed phalanx. It is more likely (if the detail is to be contested) that the total figure in Arrian is rounded up. One obviously cannot lay emphasis on this single passage in isolation, but it does cohere with the rest of the historical data for the phalanx infantry after Alexander's death.

<sup>20</sup> Brunt (n. 7) 38–39.

<sup>21</sup> Arr. vii 12.4 (cf. Justin xii 14.5; Curt. x 10.15; Metz *Epitome* 87). For the political background see E. Badian, *JHS* lxxxi (1961) 36–37 (the objections of G. T. Griffith, *PACA* viii [1965] 12 ff. are not convincing; cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxi [1971] 125 f.; Schachermeyr [n. 3] 516–518). The pattern of reinforcements during Alexander's reign is argued in greater detail below (pp. 5–9).

<sup>22</sup> The number would be even higher if Curtius' figure of 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry (x 2.8) referred to the Macedonian forces left after the demobilisation of Craterus' veterans. Unfortunately the text is not sufficiently explicit. Curtius seems to distinguish between two groups of Macedonians, those demobilised and those retained by Alexander (x 2.12, 16). But there is a further assumption that the troops retained are intended as a permanent garrison army in Asia (x 2.8, 12), and the figures given are explicitly figures for that permanent army. In other words there were *three*

groups, the Opis veterans, Alexander's royal army and the garrison army of Asia. One cannot imagine the king assigning all or the majority of his Macedonians to a force which he would not personally command, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Curtius' source intended the total of 13,000 to include mercenaries (Berve, [n. 7] i 134; Bosworth, *JHS* c [1980] 19; Brunt, *Arrian* ii [n. 7] 489). There is a strong hint that that is so in the words Alexander is made to utter a few lines later, when he claims that the soldiers with grounds for complaint are the minority of the army, *utpote cum plures dimiserim quam retenturus sum* (x 2.19). The troops retained were less than those discharged, less than 10,000, and Curtius' figure for the Asian army, if it is correctly transmitted, cannot comprise Macedonians alone.

<sup>23</sup> Arr. iv 4.1; cf. iv 22.5, 24.7, v 1.5, 27.5. Some foundations such as Nicaea and Alexandria Charax were settled exclusively by mercenaries (Arr. v 29.3, vii 21.7), but it seems that when Macedonian disabled were available they were settled in the colonies.

<sup>24</sup> Curt. vii 5.15; Arr. vi 24.1. H. Strasburger, *Hermes* lxxx (1952) 470–473, gives an impressive list of 'Strapazenberichte'.

<sup>25</sup> Arr. iii 5.5 (Arrhybas), iii 25.4 (Nicanor), vi 2.1 (Coenus), vi 27.1 (Thoas), vii 14.1 (Hephaestion).

the common soldiers. The sources provide few details, but there are consistent references to Alexander's field hospital<sup>26</sup> and one may assume that deaths there were frequent. There is an interesting extract from the contemporary Nearchus describing Alexander's use of native doctors to deal with cases of snake bite in India. He notes the relative absence of disease there because of the lack of climatic variation<sup>27</sup>—a telling comment, since the Macedonians had experienced all the rigours of the monsoon rains,<sup>28</sup> and it suggests that losses from the extremes of climate in the Iranian plateau were very high. The potentialities for wastage in Alexander's campaigns were truly immense, and there is an instructive parallel. In 48 BC Caesar arrived in Alexandria with two legions. They numbered a mere 3,200, less than half strength: 'the rest could not follow, exhausted by wounds, by toil and by the immensity of the journey' (*BC* iii 106.2). One of these legions (XXVII) had been recently levied<sup>29</sup> and the rigours of battle and travel had reduced it to less than half its strength within a year. The pressures on Alexander's army were at least as great as those experienced by Caesar's unfortunate recruits, and they continued for ten mortal years. Even if we posit exceptional toughness and resilience for Alexander's veterans (which was surely the case), we can hardly suppose that even 50% of the original expeditionary force survived the years of campaigning.<sup>30</sup> The one statement we have is that of Diodorus, who claims that 6,000 of the veterans with Craterus were from the group which crossed into Asia with Alexander, 4,000 were taken into the army during the passage (*xviii* 16.4). Unfortunately the precise nuances of the distinction cannot be recovered.<sup>31</sup> Diodorus distinguishes an earlier and a later group of Macedonians, but we cannot assume that the 6,000 were all survivors from the group which crossed the Hellespont in 334.<sup>32</sup> As we shall see, that original force was immensely supplemented by reinforcements which reached Alexander in Asia Minor over the next year. In a sense, all the infantry which fought at Issus could be classed as crossing with Alexander, at least in the eyes of an author like Hieronymus who was writing explicitly from the standpoint of 322 BC.

The conclusion is now inevitable. If Alexander's phalanx infantry totalled 18,000 or more at Opis in 324, there must have been enormous reinforcements drawn from Macedonia itself. To some degree those reinforcements are documented in the sources, but we must beware of assuming that all the contingents are recorded. Our records are partial, each author giving a different selection of reports, as we should of course expect. All extant sources are derivative and none have any reason to be exhaustive in recording routine detail. Even so, the evidence for the year after the crossing is impressive. In the spring of 333 the newly married soldiers rejoined the main army in Gordium after a winter in Macedon devoted to rest, recreation—and procreation; and with them was a newly levied contingent including 3,000 Macedonian infantry (*Arr.* i 29.4). A little later, at Ancyra, Curtius Rufus reports the arrival of an unspecified number of reinforcements from Macedon (*iii* 1.24). This could be an entirely new levy, but we cannot be

<sup>26</sup> *Arr.* ii 7.1, iv 16.6, v 8.3, vi 25.2–3; *cf.* Berve (n. 7) i 196 f.

<sup>27</sup> *Arr. Ind.* 15.11–12 (*cf.* Strabo xv 1.45 [706]) = *FGrH* 133 F 10.

<sup>28</sup> *Diod.* xvii 94.3 (70 days' rain); Strabo xv 1.27 (698).

<sup>29</sup> It first served under L. Cassius Longinus (*Caes. BC* iii 34.2) and was then transferred to the command of Q. Fufius Calenus (*BC* iii 56.2). In the interim it suffered defeat at the hands of Scipio (*Dio.* xli 51.2; *cf.* P. A. Brunt, *Italian manpower* [Oxford 1971] 692).

<sup>30</sup> Brunt (n. 7) 38 n. 35 takes a 50% survival rate as a maximum; Milns' estimate ([n. 7] 112) of 38% casualties is unacceptably low.

<sup>31</sup> Compare *Arr. Ind.* 19.5 (from Nearchus): *σὺν οἷς ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τε αὐτὸς ἀνήγαγε καὶ αὐθις οἱ ἐπὶ συλλογὴν αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς πεμφθέντες ἦκον ἔχοντες.* This is a similar distinction between the original force and later supplements, but it is much vaguer and

applies to the entirety of Alexander's army, not merely the Macedonians. In particular it is difficult to identify the sea referred to in the passage. Is it the Aegean (in which case the army of 334 is meant) or is it the Mediterranean (which Alexander left only in the summer of 331)? If the former were intended, one would expect an explicit reference to the Hellespont. The balance of probability must tip in favour of the second alternative.

<sup>32</sup> Brunt (n. 7) 38 n. 35 is inclined to distinguish between the veterans of campaigns before Gaugamela and those from later reinforcements. If we include the expeditionary force of 336/5, Alexander's Macedonian infantry may have totalled as much as 15,000 in 334 (above, pp. 2–3), and 6,000 of them may have survived to Opis. Even so, the survivors from the veterans of the crossing were not all discharged; some at least remained to serve with the *argyraspides* (*cf.* *Diod.* xix 41.1–2).

sure. It may be a variant report of the reinforcements whose arrival Arrian places at Gordium—there are similar variations elsewhere in the notices of arrivals of new contingents.<sup>33</sup> More significant, however, is a report of 5,000 infantry and 800 cavalry, who arrived from Macedon when Alexander was on the point of invading Cilicia, in the late summer of 333. The source is Polybius (xiii 19.2), quoting Callisthenes of Olynthus, Alexander's first historian and an eyewitness of the event. The report does not recur elsewhere and it has been persistently disbelieved,<sup>34</sup> but it is precise, detailed and totally credible. If it is not repeated in other sources, it is yet another testimony to their fragmentary nature. That is not all. Curtius (iii 7.8) notes that a further contingent of reinforcements was on its way from Macedonia but had not arrived when the battle was fought, around November 333. Again, the passage has been dismissed as 'imaginative writing',<sup>35</sup> but it reads factually and there is no rhetorical pointing. If Curtius has invented the detail, it is a very unobtrusive invention and immediately discarded. I see no problem in accepting that a contingent was genuinely on its way from Macedon. If so, at least three and possibly four groups of reinforcements were sent from the homeland in the course of the campaigning season of 333; two of those groups totalled 8,000 infantry and the sum total of the groups may not have been far short of the phalanx numbers of the original army. That is not surprising. Alexander knew that he had to meet the national army of Darius. He knew the Persian king had been systematically amassing forces, in particular Greek mercenaries.<sup>36</sup> He knew that he was not the favourite to win the encounter.<sup>37</sup> It was only to be expected that he would concentrate the maximum possible number of Macedonian phalanx troops for this coming battle, the most crucial and decisive of the reign. And, as we have seen, the facts of progressive wastage entail that the original corps of phalanx troops was massively reinforced. It should come as no surprise to find traces of those massive reinforcements in the source tradition.

After Issus the need for reinforcements continued. The following year, 332 BC, saw the epic seven month siege of Tyre and the hardly less epic siege of Gaza. Even the official court tradition of Arrian with its propagandist casualty figures cannot obscure the fact that losses were appalling.<sup>38</sup> Accordingly a senior officer, Amyntas son of Andromenes, was dispatched with ten triremes across the winter seas (when shipping was normally closed) on an urgent recruiting mission to Macedonia. He was active and rigorous, and he built up an army 15,000 strong, 6,000 of whom were Macedonian phalanx troops.<sup>39</sup> This recruiting took some months and it was apparently plagued by draft dodging,<sup>40</sup> but Amyntas was on his way east by midsummer 331 and he rejoined Alexander in Sittacene (between Babylon and Susa) towards the end of the year.<sup>41</sup> It had been nearly two years since the last recorded Macedonian reinforcements, and we

<sup>33</sup> The clearest case is the arrival of Amyntas' reinforcements (below), which is placed by Arrian (iii 16.10) at Susa, by Curtius (v 1.39) at Babylon, and by Diodorus (xvii 65.1) midway in Sittacene.

<sup>34</sup> Berve (n. 7) i 179 suggested that the total was a conflation of all reports of reinforcements between the Hellespont and Issus; K. J. Beloch (*Griechische Geschichte* iii<sup>2</sup>. 2 [Berlin 1923] 331 f.) that it was a garbled report of Arrian's Gordium reinforcements (so Milns [n. 7] 106). Neither view is cogent. Polybius' report is detailed, giving precise numbers and a fairly precise location, and it cannot be combined with any other material in the sources. He does not mention the reinforcements at Gordium and Ancyra, but that is immaterial. His purpose is to prove that the Macedonian forces could not be deployed in the terrain of Issus in the phalanx formation described by Callisthenes, and, given his erroneous assumption that the phalanx comprised *all* Alexander's infantry, it was easy to demonstrate. He only needed Callisthenes' figures at the crossing and the most recent reinforcements. It was not necessary for him to chase up each and every reinforcement reported by Callisthenes (he is content with a theoretical estimate

of absentees from the battle).

<sup>35</sup> J. E. Atkinson, *A commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni: Books 3 and 4* (Amsterdam 1980) 181.

<sup>36</sup> Arr. ii 2.1; Curt. iii 3.1. See further Bosworth (n. 2) 181; Atkinson (n. 35) 115 f.

<sup>37</sup> Aeschin. iii 164; Diod. xvii 32.4; Joseph. *AJ* xi 315 f.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Arr. ii 21.3, 22.6–7. The vulgate account is vivid and explicit about casualties; see Bosworth, 'Arrian and the Alexander Vulgate', *Fond. Hardt* xxii (1976) 17–20.

<sup>39</sup> For Amyntas' mission see Diod. xvii 49.1; Curt. iv 6.30. The numbers of his reinforcements are provided by the vulgate alone (Diod. xvii 65.1; Curt. v 1.40–42).

<sup>40</sup> Curt. vii 1.37–40. The context is a forensic speech, but the statement is detailed, specifically naming three reluctant conscripts. There is no warrant for dismissing it as invention.

<sup>41</sup> This chronology has controversial implications for the interpretation of Agis' war (cf. Bosworth, *Phoenix* xix [1975] 35–37; Atkinson [n. 35] 483 f.), but they are fortunately irrelevant to the issue here.

cannot exclude the possibility of smaller contingents having arrived in the interim. Alexander had to meet the Persian army again, this time in Mesopotamia, and his need for phalanx troops was undiminished. Antipater was still sending reinforcements, like the small group of mercenaries and Thracians whose arrival in Egypt is casually noted by Arrian (iii 5.1). There may well have been some minor contingents of Macedonian infantry.

After 331 there is no record of further reinforcements of Macedonians. Given the incomplete nature of our sources this might be fortuitous; but there is reason to think that reinforcements of Macedonian infantry *were* in short supply in the latter part of the reign. The sources continue to give a record of the arrival of fresh levies, but the vast majority recorded are mercenaries.<sup>42</sup> In the summer of 330 Alexander discharged his allied infantry and sent them west to the Cilician coast.<sup>43</sup> The officer who accompanied them was Epocillus, son of Polyoides. He returned nearly two years later, in the early months of 328. With him were substantial forces of mercenaries from the satrapies of Asia Minor.<sup>44</sup> There was a large contingent of 8,000 (including 600 cavalry) from Antipater, but Curtius is explicit that they were Greeks. Elsewhere he clearly distinguishes Greeks from Macedonians in the reinforcements,<sup>45</sup> and, unless he was totally careless, we can only assume that the bulk of the contingent sent by Antipater consisted of mercenaries from Greece proper. Two years before he had sent out a body of 3,000 Illyrians (Curt. vi 6.35). It looks as though Antipater was conscribing levies from peoples who were his potential enemies while retaining what remained of the Macedonian infantry. Alexander apparently was not happy. In the spring of 327 Epocillus and two other officers returned to their homeland with specific instructions 'to bring up the army from Macedonia' (Arr. iv 18.3). Nothing more is heard of this commission and there is no record of any large Macedonian army joining Alexander after his return from India.<sup>46</sup> Indeed the instructions received by Craterus in 324, to replace Antipater and send him to Asia at the head of a fresh army of Macedonians (Justin xii 12.9; Arr. vii 12.4), almost presupposes that there had been no large scale movements of native Macedonians in the recent past. But the mission of Epocillus was probably not Alexander's first attempt at acquiring a new injection of phalanx soldiers. In the early summer of 329 the king had sent home a small contingent of Macedonian veterans (Arr. iii 29.5), and their commanders were probably detailed to levy new forces, as was Epocillus two years later. Whether or not they were sent to recruit, a very large body of reinforcements did come (Diod. xvii 95.4 speaks of 30,000 foot and 6,000 cavalry). It caught up with Alexander just before the start of his Indus voyage late in 326. These reinforcements were evidently described in detail by Cleitarchus, whose narrative is summarised by Diodorus and Curtius Rufus.<sup>47</sup> Neither of these extant reports speaks of Macedonians, and Diodorus analyses the reinforcements as 'allies and

<sup>42</sup> Berve (n. 7) i 184 gives a convenient summary of the data.

<sup>43</sup> Arr. iii 19.5–6; Diod. xvii 74.3–4.

<sup>44</sup> Curtius (vii 10.11–12) gives the only detailed report of figures. Arrian (iv 7.2) confirms the date and agrees on the names of the principal commanders of contingents.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Curt. v 1.40–41: *Macedonum peditum VI milia . . . cum his DC Thracas, adiunctis peditibus eiusdem generis III milibus D et ex Peloponneso mercenarius miles ad III milia advenerat.*

<sup>46</sup> A certain Menidas arrived in Babylon in 323, bringing his unit of cavalry (Arr. vii 23.1). He is usually identified with the Menidas sent with Epocillus in 327, and it is suggested that he brought one of several contingents from Macedon (Berve ii 257 no. 508; Brunt [n. 7] 39; Milns [n. 7] 109). But Arrian combines Menidas' arrival with the arrival of the satraps of Caria and Lydia. He is, I think, the Menidas assigned to the garrison of Media in 330 (Arr. iii 26.3: *pace* Berve, there is no reason to think that he was recalled to the main

army before 327 and sent to Macedon with Epocillus—there were two distinct individuals). The other Median commanders rejoined Alexander in Carmania, bringing the bulk of the holding army (Arr. vi 27.3). I suggest that Menidas was summoned later and brought with him the residual force of mercenary cavalry. If so, he was untainted by the accusations of corruption made against his colleagues, for he continued in favour at court (cf. Arr. vii 26.2).

<sup>47</sup> Diod. xvii 95.4 (totals only: 30,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, 25,000 infantry panoplies and 100 talents of medicine); Curt. ix 3.21 (Memnon brings 5,000 cavalry from Thrace, 7,000 mercenary infantry from Harpalus and 25,000 gold and silver panoplies). The original clearly gave a detailed list of contingents which Curtius reproduced very partially while Diodorus recorded the grand total alone. If there was a Macedonian contingent as argued by Brunt (Arrian ii [n. 7] 488–89), it was not particularly prominent, for it is excluded from both reports.

mercenaries from Greece'. That implicitly excludes Macedonians, and, while one cannot state dogmatically that the reinforcements of 326 contained no Macedonian infantry, it is clear that the vast bulk comprised mercenaries.

The evidence indicates that the great majority of Alexander's phalanx infantry was taken from Macedon before the end of 331 BC. All of these men who survived weathered a minimum of seven years of campaigning in conditions virtually guaranteed to produce a large wastage,<sup>48</sup> and, if the phalanx at Opis was some 18,000 strong, it follows that a minimum of 30,000 men (perhaps nearer 40,000) were taken out of Macedon between 334 and 331. The few explicit figures given in our lacunose tradition come to a total of 26,000, and, as we have seen, Curtius Rufus records other contingents of unspecified strength. The pattern is clear, and the drain on Macedonian manpower, particularly in the year before Issus, must have been prodigious. The effects are difficult to trace, as so few precise figures are transmitted; but it is clear that Antipater was seriously embarrassed by the military emergencies in the latter years of Alexander's reign. When the Spartan king Agis III went to war in the Peloponnese and laid siege to Megalopolis (331/0), Antipater had difficulties mobilising an army.<sup>49</sup> Eventually his forces numbered 40,000, but we have no idea of their composition except that there was a huge influx of mercenaries from allied Greek states.<sup>50</sup> The proportion of native Macedonians may have been relatively small. We are better served for the Lamian War of 323/2 BC. Immediately after Alexander's death Antipater was faced by an alliance of the Greek states of the south, led by the Athenians and Aetolians. Trouble had been brewing for nearly two years, but even so the forces mobilised by Antipater were surprisingly small. The army he led into Thessaly comprised 13,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. That was the entire force, and we cannot assume that all the infantry were Macedonian phalanx men.<sup>51</sup> Presumably Antipater, like Alexander before him and Cassander later, used Paeonian and Illyrian auxiliaries. Certainly Diodorus (xviii 12.2), who here draws upon the contemporary Hieronymus of Cardia, notes that Macedon was drained of citizen troops because of the bulk of reinforcements sent to Asia—welcome confirmation of what is overwhelmingly implied by the attested figures. As yet Macedonia was not exhausted. Antipater could leave behind his lieutenant Sippas with forces of his own and a commission to levy further troops.<sup>52</sup> But Antipater himself was in desperate straits, compelled to undergo a siege at Lamia. He was reinforced first by Leonnatus, the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who joined him with 20,000 foot and 1,500 horse. These forces included some of Sippas' new recruits from Macedon, but the bulk were probably mercenaries.<sup>53</sup> It was only the long delayed arrival of Craterus with his 10,000 veterans of Alexander's campaigns which raised Antipater's forces to 40,000 for the decisive battle of Crannon.<sup>54</sup> The numbers are deceptively impressive, and we lack the key figure, the number of phalanx infantry available to Antipater at the time of Alexander's death. I do not think that it was more than 10,000, and the forces of Antipater

<sup>48</sup> Note the comments of Diodorus (xvii 94.1–2) and Arrian (v 27.5–6: Coenus' speech). Even if rhetorically pointed they represent the conventional view in antiquity.

<sup>49</sup> Aeschin. iii 165 (πολὺν χρόνον συνῆγε στρατόπεδον). I have argued elsewhere (*Phoenix* xix [1975] 38 ff.) that this recruiting took place over the winter of 331/0. The delay, however, is a fact and independent of the exact chronology.

<sup>50</sup> Diod. xvii 63.1. The allies are not named, but they probably included Corinth, Argos and Messenia as well as the northern members of the Corinthian League (cf. E. I. McQueen, *Historia* xxvii [1978] 40–51). Antipater had a large pool of allies antipathetic to Sparta.

<sup>51</sup> Diodorus (xviii 12.2) terms all Antipater's infantry Μακεδόνες, but the blanket designation means very little. He probably inferred that all the troops on the Macedonian side were native Macedonian. The

alternative, that he omitted a non-Macedonian contingent, is most improbable. If Antipater had far more than 13,000 foot at the outset, it is hard to explain his later discomfiture, and the attested numbers at Crannon appear surprisingly small.

<sup>52</sup> Diod. xviii 12.2: ἀπέλιπε στρατηγὸν Σίππαν, δούς στρατιώτας τοὺς ἱκανοὺς καὶ παραγγείλας στρατολογεῖν ὡς πλείστους.

<sup>53</sup> Diod. xviii 14.5 Leonnatus seems to have modelled himself on Alexander, with a vanguard of Nisaeon horses and his own *agema* of Companions ('Suda' s.v. Λεόννατος = Arr. *Succ.* F 12 [Roos]—probably describing the advance through northern Greece). Unfortunately this permits no inference about the proportion of Macedonians in his army.

<sup>54</sup> Diod. xviii 16.4–5. Antipater and Craterus retained an army of 30,000 for the campaign against the Aetolians over the winter of 332/1 (Diod. xviii 24.1).



combined with the new levies of Sippas will hardly have been greater than the original phalanx that Alexander took over the Hellespont in 334. In that case the reserves of Macedonian manpower in 323 were less than a half, probably nearer a third, of what they had been in 334. It is not surprising that Antipater was reluctant to release more phalanx troops for the Asian front after the shock of Agis' war, and his reluctance to send troops must have been a major factor in the deterioration of relations between the king and his regent.

The drain of reinforcements had a profound effect. Few of the men Alexander took with him ever returned. An unspecified but small group of veterans and disabled were sent back from the Oxus in 329,<sup>55</sup> but that is the only recorded repatriation of Macedonians before the release of Craterus' 10,000 in 324. Even these veterans, for all Alexander's promises, never took up residence again in Macedonia. After fighting at Crannon they went on to campaign in Aetolia over the winter of 322/1 and were immediately embroiled in the civil war against Perdiccas which broke out in the spring of 321. Then both Craterus and Antipater led expeditionary forces into Asia Minor, and Craterus' infantry alone numbered 20,000, most of whom were battle-hardened Macedonians (Diod. xviii 30.4). Craterus must have retained his veterans as a fighting body. After their defeat at Eumenes' hands they made their way to Antipater and under his leadership reached the victory conference at Triparadeisus. The following year Antipater returned home with what remained of the national levy (Diod. xviii 39.7), sadly depleted by the year's campaigning. It was weakened still further by the detachment of forces to combat the Perdiccan armies still operating in Asia Minor. Antigonos alone had 8,500 infantry from Antipater's invasion army, and even Arrhidaeus, the relatively humble satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, is attested in command of 1,000 Macedonian troops in 319.<sup>56</sup> The rest of the army of Alexander was split up among the Successors, all of whom placed a high premium on native Macedonian troops. Many of these died on campaign, like the famous Silver Shields who ended their career of glory in 316, when they were dispersed, the most formidable assigned to distant Arachosia to be deliberately decimated on suicide missions and the rest ordered to remote and difficult garrison duty.<sup>57</sup> Those who were discharged remained in Asia to form the nucleus of the new settlements. Very few ever returned to Macedonia. I can find no record except for 3,000 mutinous soldiers of Antigonos who successfully forced their release in the winter of 321/20.<sup>58</sup> The overwhelming majority lived and died outside the country of their birth.

For Macedonia proper the generation of Alexander was literally a dead generation. Within three years the king had removed over 30,000 men in their prime and removed them totally. For breeding purposes they were gone forever. Alexander did once make the popular gesture of sending home the newly married men, but that affected a small number over the limited period of winter 334/3 (Arr. i 24.1–2). And it was an unrepeatable concession. Henceforward the Macedonians would form liaisons with the women of Asia and their offspring became the children of the camp. This new generation had no domicile, and Alexander made it his business that they should remain in Asia. Even the families of Craterus' veterans were separated and retained with the main army at Opis.<sup>59</sup> Back in Macedonia the birthrate could only have declined. For a time there was a respite as the children born towards the end of Philip's reign grew into manhood,<sup>60</sup> but there was necessarily a deterioration with the generation born after

<sup>55</sup> Arr. iii 29.5: τῶν τε Μακεδόνων ἐπιλέξας τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους καὶ ἤδη ἀπολέμους . . . ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπέστειλεν.

<sup>56</sup> Arr. *Succ.* F. 1.43; Diod. xix 29.3 (Antigonos); Diod. xviii 51.1 (Arrhidaeus: 1,000 Macedonians to 10,000 mercenaries and 500 Persian bowmen and slingers). The latter may well have served with Craterus (*cf.* Diod. xviii 16.4), to be transferred to Arrhidaeus' command after Triparadeisus.

<sup>57</sup> Diod. xix 48.3–4; Polyae. iv 6.15; Plut. *Eum.* 19. For a survey of Macedonian troops in the armies of the Successors see Launey (n. 8) i 295–303.

<sup>58</sup> Polyae. iv 6.6. The episode has been variously dated, but it took place when Antigonos was wintering in Cappadocia. The best context seems to be the operations against Eumenes after Triparadeisus. Then Antigonos had only 5,000 of the Macedonians given him by Antipater (*cf.* Diod. xviii 40.7 with R. Engels, *MH* xxxviii [1971] 228 f.). The mutineers may already have been discharged.

<sup>59</sup> Arr. vii 12.2; *cf.* Justin xii 4.1–11.

<sup>60</sup> In 318 BC Polyperchon was able to raise an army of 20,000 Macedonian infantry and 4,000 allies for his invasion of Attica (Diod. xviii 68.3) and in 321, even

334 BC. The years after 320 would have seen an abrupt reduction of potential recruits in their late teens. Yet again we are at the mercy of our sources, which give no comprehensive account of the military forces of Macedon during this period of decline. The most telling episode took place in 302 BC. In that year Cassander, the king of Macedon, faced an invasion of Thessaly at the hands of Demetrius Poliorcetes, who was moving north from Athens with a massive army some 56,000 strong. It was a desperate crisis, and we are explicitly told that Cassander concentrated all his forces to meet the invading army. These comprised 29,000 foot and 2,000 horse.<sup>61</sup> The total is not broken down into contingents, and we cannot tell what proportion of the whole the Macedonian phalanx formed. What is more, these figures do not do full justice to the Macedonian reserves at this period, for a portion of the army (probably small) was serving in Asia Minor with Lysimachus<sup>62</sup> and we have no total for it. None the less Cassander was vastly outnumbered by Demetrius and the forces he was able to muster, including his allies, were 10,000 less than those deployed by Antipater at Crannon twenty years before. Compared with the forces at Alexander's disposal they were almost nugatory.

The Macedonian armies never regained their numbers. At the battle of Sellasia in 222 BC the Macedonian infantry comprised 13,000 out of a total infantry line of 27,600 (Plb. ii 65.2–6). This was an army of the same dimensions as Cassander's forces in Thessaly, but the crisis was less intense, and Antigonos Doson may have kept a substantial portion of his Macedonian infantry in reserve.<sup>63</sup> Twenty five years later, however, Philip V was in desperate straits before the battle of Cynoscephalae, his manpower reduced by the extravagant wars of his reign. Even though he enlisted sixteen year olds and time expired veterans, his native infantry numbered only 18,000.<sup>64</sup> This was the nadir. Philip and his son Perseus spent the next generation in peace, actively encouraging the procreation of children, and by 172 the population was considered adequate for war.<sup>65</sup> Even so, the resources of Perseus could not match those of Alexander. His army in 171 was the greatest led by any Macedonian king since Alexander crossed into Asia (Liv. xlii 51.11); out of a total of 39,000 infantry almost half were phalangites, and the full complement of Macedonian infantry was 26,000 (Liv. xlii 51.3–11). The numbers are impressive, but they were the product of years of peace and deliberate stimulation of the birth rate. They still fell far short of Alexander's generation. The army at Gaugamela alone totalled 40,000 foot; and, as we have seen, Alexander could draw over 30,000 infantry from Macedonia within three years, still leaving reserves of manpower within the homeland. Alexander's conquests, for all their glory, were ultimately fateful for the military and political destiny of Macedon. Philip's reign had brought the country to a position of overwhelming supremacy in the Greek world. By 335 BC the lesson of Chaeronea had been underscored by the destruction of Thebes. Macedon was the supreme and invincible, her military dominance based on reserves of manpower which could not be remotely matched by any other state. By the end of Alexander's reign the balance had been tipped. The actual armies of Macedon were depleted and the potential for supplementing them destroyed. In the opening engagements of the Lamian War the Macedonian forces were

after the departure of the expeditionary forces of Antipater and Craterus, he was able to crush a revolt in Thessaly μετὰ δυνάμεως ἄξιολόγου (Diod. xviii 38.6; cf. H. D. Westlake, *CR* lxiii [1949] 90). In the latter case no figure is given for the whole army, let alone the native Macedonians, and in the former there is every likelihood that the forces from Macedon included mercenaries as well as citizen troops.

<sup>61</sup> Diod. xx 110.4; cf. M. Fortina, *Cassandro, re di Macedonia* (Turin 1965) 102–5.

<sup>62</sup> Diod. xx 107.1: the majority of these forces may have come from the Autariatae settled by Cassander around Mt. Orbelus—2,000 of them are attested serving with Lysimachus (Diod. xx 113.3; cf. xix 19.1). According to Plutarch (*Demetr.* 23.2) 6,000 Macedonians had come over to Demetrius when he captured

Heracleia in 304. Once again it is difficult to define what is meant by 'Macedonians'. They were presumably not all phalanx troops, for the total Macedonian component of Demetrius' army was only 8,000 (Diod. xx 110.4) and he must have received a substantial nucleus of Macedonian troops from his father Antigonos (he had commanded 5,000 during the Babylonian campaign of 312 [cf. Diod. xix 100.4]).

<sup>63</sup> Plutarch (*Arat.* 43.1) claims that Doson deployed 20,000 Macedonian infantry in 224 BC, but once again there is no figure given for non-Macedonian troops. Plutarch may have assumed that the army was wholly composed of native Macedonians.

<sup>64</sup> For Philip's levy and its results see Liv. xxxiii 3.1–5, 4.4–6.

<sup>65</sup> Liv. xxxix 24.3; xlii 11.6.

both outnumbered and defeated, and it was already obvious that the numerical superiority of Philip's reign could not be recovered.

These stark facts explain Alexander's posthumous reputation in his own country. His ultimate successor, Cassander, was able to execute his mother and imprison his wife and son without apparent resistance from the commons.<sup>66</sup> Whether he conducted a personal vendetta may perhaps be doubted. He may well, as Plutarch reports, have been deeply affected by Alexander's ferocious behaviour at Babylon, breaking into a sweating fit at the very sight of a statue of the king,<sup>67</sup> but personal hostility was an expensive luxury if it harmed him politically. As a usurper he was bound to conciliate public opinion, not affront it directly. There was no question of a *damnatio memoriae* of the late king. Cassander could himself commission a painting of the combat between Alexander and Darius from the great Philoxenus of Eretria (Plin. *NH* xxxv 110), and that painting would commemorate the victory of the Macedonian army as much as the victory of Alexander.<sup>68</sup> What seems clear is that the memory of Alexander was subordinated to that of his father. Cassander wooed Philip's daughter Cleopatra and eventually married Thessalonice, another of his daughters. He also paid conspicuous honour to Philip III and Eurydice, both progeny of Philip who had perished at Olympias' agency.<sup>69</sup> On the other hand Rhoxane and Alexander IV were immured in Amphipolis, deprived of their royal accoutrements<sup>70</sup> and eventually murdered. There was no popular protest. Some resentment there may have been. In 294, when Demetrius seized the Macedonian throne, the sons of Cassander suffered from their father's hostile attitude to Alexander, and Demetrius exploited the theme in his propaganda.<sup>71</sup> But it was a relatively unimportant issue. Demetrius' greatest asset was not his championship of the dead Alexander but the fact that he was married to Phila, the daughter of Antipater and ex-wife of Craterus, whose memory *was* cherished in Macedonia.<sup>72</sup>

By contrast there was little attempt, even by Cassander's enemies, to mobilise Alexander's memory against him. When Antigonos attacked his policies at Tyre in 315, his speech (as recorded by Diodorus) does not mention Alexander. Cassander's attacks on his mother, wife and son are interpreted as a means to secure the throne, not as an affront to the late king, and the restoration of Thebes is criticised as the rebuilding of a city destroyed by the *Macedonians*.<sup>73</sup> Cassander's improper ambitions are the focus of the attack and his victim is not so much Alexander as the Macedonian people as a whole. If anything, Antigonos is avoiding references to Alexander. He is certainly not representing him as wronged by Cassander. The one attempt to

<sup>66</sup> For details and sources see R. M. Errington, 'Alexander in the Hellenistic world', *Fond. Hardt* xxii (1976) 146–52. P. Goukowsky, *Essai sur les origines du mythe d'Alexandre* i (Nancy 1978) 105–11 (see also his Budé edition of Diodorus xvii, pp. xxiv–xxvi; F. Chamoux, in *Ancient Macedonia* iii [Thessaloniki 1983] 57–66), dismisses the entire tradition of Cassander's hostility to Alexander as a distorted echo of the propaganda of Antigonos and Demetrius. It is true that modern scholars have been too ready to infer a vendetta against the entire memory of Alexander. There must, however, have been *some* hostile acts, as Plutarch (*Demetr.* 37.3) emphasises when he describes as a matter of fact the Macedonians' hatred for what Cassander had done against the dead Alexander (ἄ Κάσσανδρος εἰς Ἀλέξανδρον τεθνηκότα παρενόμησεν). Demetrius may have capitalised upon the hostility but he did not originate it. As for Antigonos, he was careful *not* to invoke the memory of Alexander against Cassander (see below). One cannot accredit him with the creation of a myth. The verdict of Diod. xvii 117.2 is probably the standard reaction to Cassander's attested actions, not an echo of propaganda. See also E. Mikrogianakes, in *Ancient Macedonia* ii (Thessaloniki 1977) 225–36.

<sup>67</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.6. On this passage see G. Bendinelli, *RFIC* xciii (1965) 150–64; Fortina (n. 61) 10–11.

<sup>68</sup> This is conceded by Goukowsky (n. 66) 110. The fact that Cassander called one of his sons Alexander is immaterial: the name was common in the Argead house and, for that matter, in Macedonia—it was not unique to the son of Philip.

<sup>69</sup> Diod. xx 37.4 (Cleopatra); xix 52.1, 61.2 (Thessalonice); xix 52.5 (Philip and Eurydice). Cf. Errington (n. 64) 152: 'paradoxically his anti-Alexander policy relied very heavily on the reputation of Philip.'

<sup>70</sup> Diod. xix 52.4 (cf. Justin xiv 6.13). This denial of royal privilege is a strong argument against Goukowsky's thesis ([n. 66] 106) that Rhoxane and her son were merely kept in protective custody to prevent their being exploited by other contenders for power. Cassander was deliberately treating the legitimate king as a private individual.

<sup>71</sup> Plut. *Demetr.* 37.3; Justin xvi 1.15–17.

<sup>72</sup> Plut. *Demetr.* 37.4, cf. 14.2; Diod. xix 59.3–6.

<sup>73</sup> Diod. xix 61.2: ἔτι δὲ ὡς Ὀλυμθίουσιν ὄντας πολέμιωτάτους Μακεδόνων κατάρκισεν... καὶ Θήβας ἀνέστησε τὰς ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων κατασκαφείσας. See also Justin xv 1.3.

capitalise on the memory of the conqueror was made by Olympias. When she invaded Macedon in 317, the army of her rival Eurydice immediately deserted to her cause.<sup>74</sup> She emphasised the supposed benefits conferred by her son and tried to denigrate the family of Antipater as assassins who had removed him by poison (Diod. xix 11.8–9). At the same time she attacked the surviving progeny of Philip, driving Philip Arrhidaeus and Eurydice to their deaths. Her savagery provoked popular revulsion, and within a year Cassander was able to invade Macedon, besiege her in Pydna and finally have her condemned *in absentia* by a general assembly of Macedonians.<sup>75</sup> Her cruelty and vindictiveness had largely caused her downfall, but the magic of Alexander's name did nothing to help her. The evocation of his memory was totally ineffectual. It is easy to see why. Alexander the king was a distant memory in his homeland. He had left it at the age of 22 and never returned. With him had gone a generation of men, and the populace at large would have bitter memories of fathers, sons and brothers who had disappeared. He may have led his men to wealth and glory, but those who remained had little profit and lasting grief. The hero of Macedon was Philip, who had built his country's supremacy. His son had squandered that inheritance—in the eyes of the Macedonians at least.

The view one takes of Alexander is necessarily dependent on one's perspective as observer. The modern scholar has the advantage of hindsight. He can see the ultimate result of the movement of population into Asia which Alexander initiated and the political consequences of his conquests. It is therefore easy to see him as the champion of Hellenism, however remote such an intention may have been from his mind. For his soldiers he was the great captain whose leadership secured victory, glory and (in some cases) wealth, and, not surprisingly, it was his veterans who preserved his memory with most reverence and enthusiasm. For nations such as the Egyptians and Babylonians he was a liberator who ended centuries of hated rule by the Persians and imposed a régime of his own which had yet to be hated. For most of the people he encountered, particularly the Persians, Bactrians, Sogdians and Indians, he was a destroyer who passed through the land with fire and slaughter to impress his own domination. Paradoxically it was as a destroyer that Alexander impinged most upon Macedon itself. The finest generation of fighting men produced in the ancient world was snatched from its homeland and taken to fight and die in the recesses of Asia; and the country was set on a path of decline that proved irreversible. From this perspective it is hard to understand the once fashionable picture of the humanitarian Alexander dreaming of the brotherhood of man under his enlightened monarchy. However, I concede that he did achieve a unity—of a kind. I am reminded of the unforgettable final scene of Ingmar Bergman's film, *The Seventh Seal*, in which the disparate cast, their differences at last reconciled, float hand in hand over the horizon in an ethereal dance led by Death triumphant. That was the unity of Alexander—the whole of mankind, Greeks and Macedonians, Medes and Persians, Bactrians and Indians, linked together in a never ending dance of death.

A. B. BOSWORTH

*University of Western Australia*

<sup>74</sup> Diod. xix 11.2 claims that the Macedonians remembered the benefactions of Alexander and respected the *axioma* of Olympias. Her propaganda certainly stressed the achievements of her son, but it may have been her status as Philip's wife which tipped the balance (cf. Justin xiv 5.10: *seu memoria mariti seu magnitudine filii*).

<sup>75</sup> Diod. xix 35–36; Justin xiv 6. See Briant (n. 1) 297–99, E. Lévy, *Ktéma* iii (1978) 208–9, and Errington, *Chiron* viii (1978) 118 ff. for the constitutional significance (or insignificance) of the trial of Olympias.